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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

Case No. 20010739-CA

vs.

TUONG XUAN DANG,
Defendant/Appellant.

Priority No. 2
:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals from a restitution order imposed following a conviction for
attempted falsification of title and registration of a motor vehicle, a class A
misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-4-101 (1973) and § 41-la-1315
(1992), in the Third Judicial District, Salt Lake County, the Honorable Michael K.
Burton presiding.
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e)
(1996).

1

ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Did the trial court err by requiring that defendant pay restitution where (1)
defendant admitted that without authorization he transferred title to the victim's van
and gave the van to a third party, and (2) the van was subsequently "totaled"?
Sentencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. "We will not
vacate an order of restitution unless the trial court abused its discretion or exceeded
its authority. However, if the trial court's order is premised on statutory
interpretation . . . we afford the trial court's interpretation no deference and review
for correctness." State v. Dominguez, 1999 UT App 343, ^ 6, 992 P.2d 995
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following relevant constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are
included in Addendum A:
UTAH CODE ANN.
UTAH CODE ANN.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 76-4-101 (1973)
§ 41-la-1315 (1992)
§ 76-3-201 (Supp 2001).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Defendant was charged by information with giving false evidence of title and
registration, a second degree felony, and theft, a second degree felony. R. 1.
Defendant entered a plea of no contest to attempted falsification of evidence of title
and registration, a class A misdemeanor. R. 26. As part of the plea agreement, the
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State dropped the theft charge. R. 29. The trial court accepted the plea and ordered
preparation of a presentence report (PSI). R. 26.
Prior to sentencing, the court conducted a combined sentencing and restitution
hearing. R. 58:4-45. Following the hearing, the court sentenced defendant to a
180-day term of incarceration, but suspended the total term. The court imposed a
$600 fine and required that defendant pay $200 in attorney's fees. The court also
ordered that defendant pay $1,475 restitution to the victim and $5,977.81 restitution
to her insurance company.
Defendant timely appealed. R. 47.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
No trial was held in this case. The facts are therefore taken from the PSI and
the transcript of the sentencing hearing. The victim's and defendant's versions of
the facts differ.
Victim's Version
The victim, Christine Blatnick, testified at the sentencing hearing that she first
took her custom van to defendant to have him put locks on its windows. R. 58:6.
She then approached him about doing some further work on the vehicle. Id. at 7.
During their discussions, she mentioned that she was going to take her van to
Maaco to have it painted. Id. Defendant offered to paint the van for $500, and Ms.
Blatnick accepted. Id. When she went to pick up the van on December 24, 1998,
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defendant presented a bill for an amount between $4,000 and $5,000 for a paint job
from K.V. Auto Body. Id. Ms. Blatnick stated that she had not given defendant
permission to hire K.V. Id.
A dispute ensued, with defendant arguing that, in addition to the paint job, he
had done certain body work on the vehicle. Id. at 8. Defendant and Ms. Blatnick
then called the police to arbitrate the dispute. Id. The police suggested that Ms.
Blatnick pay defendant $500, take the vehicle home, and later resolve the matter
with K.V. Id. The parties agreed to that plan. Id.
Ms. Blatnick returned the vehicle to defendant in January or February 1999 to
have him fix some runs in the paint and do the additional work she had requested
prior to the paint job. Id. at 8-9. Ms. Blatnick testified that she left the van with
defendant until January 2000, calling every three or four weeks to see if the work
was done and telling defendant to take his time because she had another vehicle.
Id. at 10.
In January 2000, Ms. Blatnick went to defendant's shop with her title to get
the van. Id. at 10. Defendant told her the van was in the back bay, but that she
"wasn't getting it" until she paid the four- or five-thousand-dollar paint bill. Id.
Ms. Blatnick then called the police. Id. When the police arrived, they went to the
back bay, but the van was not there. Id.
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One of the officers then ran a title search and learned that Ms. Blatnick was no
longer the owner. Id. The title had been changed in March 1999. Id. Department
of Motor Vehicles officer Bryce Greer investigated the title change. PSI at 2. He
learned that defendant had used American Car Title to have the title changed to
Huang Ha, apparently as compensation for the K.V. paint job. Id. Defendant had
told American Car Title that Mr. and Ms. Blatnick "now lived in California and
were no longer interested in the van." Id.
When the police got the vehicle back in March or April 2000, it had been
stripped and was "pretty much totaled." R. 58:11, 14. Ms. Blatnick filed a claim
with her insurance company, and the company paid her $5,997.18, the value of the
vehicle less her $100 deductible. Id. at 11; see also R. 45-46 (insurance company
documentation).
Defendant's Version
Defendant, who owned New Image Vans, testified that Ms. Blatnick came to
him in November, 1998, asking him to "fix up" her van. R. 58:20-21. He told her
that the vehicle was rusted, the seats were broken, the head liner was gone, certain
power functions were not working, and the vehicle would not pass inspection. Id.
at 22. He gave her an estimate of $2,700, apparently for half of the paint job,
relying on her assurance that the insurance company would pay for the other half.
Id. Defendant, who also owned a half-interest in K.V. Body Shop, a business
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housed in the same building as New Image Vans, told her that the van would be
painted in K.V.'s bay. Id. at 23.
Defendant subsequently took Ms. Blatnick to see the progress on the van
during the time it was being worked on. Id. He also told her to bring the money to
pay for the work when she came to pick up the van. Id. When she came to get the
van on Christmas Eve, she did not have the money. Id. at 24. When defendant
would not give her the van, she called the police. Id. The police said they could
not do much, it was Christmas Eve, and defendant would have to do something so
that everyone could go home. Id. Defendant agreed to release the van when Ms.
Blatnick gave him a postdated check for $500. Id. Ms. Blatnick saw a paint run on
the vehicle, and defendant told her to bring it back after the holidays. Id. at 25.
Ms. Blatnick brought the van back early in January for repair of the paint run
and for painting the grill. Id. at 27. At that time she signed an agreement, stating
that the insurance company would pay for the rest of the work—$2,791 less her
$100 deductible. Id. Defendant called her insurance company the next day and
learned that the company had paid her entire claim thirty days earlier. Id.
When K. V. pressured defendant for payment of its work on the van, defendant
"g[a]ve them the van." Id. at 28. Defendant admitted transferring the title to
"someone else's name" in March or May of 1999. R. 29. Defendant testified that
he had the vehicle in his shop "from January until they picked it up in May." Id. It
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is not clear from his testimony whether defendant meant May 1999, when his
partner(s) in K.V. received the vehicle, or May 2000, when the police repossessed
it. See id. at 30.
Defendant argued that he owed money to neither the insurance company nor
Ms. Blatnick. Id. at 44. He argued that she still owed him $4,000, she never came
in to pay him, and this was the reason the van was in the shop so long. Id.
Additional Testimony Regarding Restitution
The State sought restitution only for the amount paid by the insurance
company and for Ms. Blatnick's $100 deductible. Id. at 12, 42. Ms. Blatnick asked
for $1,375 more—$674 in insurance premiums, $500 for the paint job, and $201 for
the head liner she bought for the van—plus an unspecified figure for loss of use
during "the 27 months [she] didn't have [her] van." Id. at 12-13. The court denied
Ms. Blatnick's claim for loss of use, but ordered restitution to the insurance
company for $5,977.81 and restitution to Ms. Blatnick for $1,475 to cover her
deductible, the insurance premiums, the paint job, and the head liner. Id. at 46.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defendant admitted that to facilitate transfer of the van's title he falsely
represented that the lawful owner had abandoned the vehicle. He also admitted that
he conveyed the van to a third party. Following these unauthorized acts, the van
was involved in one or more accidents and was stripped of much of its equipment.
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Defendant thereby admitted responsibility for criminal activities that resulted in
pecuniary damages. The trial court properly ordered that he pay restitution for the
damages.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ORDERED THAT DEFENDANT
PAY RESTITUTION WHERE (1) DEFENDANT ADMITTED THAT
WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION HE TRANSFERRED TITLE TO THE
VICTIM'S VAN AND GAVE THE VAN TO A THIRD PARTY, AND
(2) THE VAN WAS SUBSEQUENTLY "TOTALED"
Defendant argues that the trial court "exceeded its authority . . . when it
imposed restitution upon [defendant] for damage caused to [Ms.] Blatnick's van
after he transferred its title to another company." Br. Aplt. at 7. Defendant argues
that he did not plead or admit "to the conduct that actually resulted in the damage to
the van" and that "he did not agree to pay the costs imposed as part of the plea
bargain." Id. Defendant did, however, admit to falsifying the title and transferring
the van to another party, and that admission was sufficient to make him responsible
for damages that occurred following the transfer, even if he did not personally
wreck and strip down the vehicle.
Utah law mandates restitution for criminal activities which include, in addition
to offenses for which a defendant is convicted, other criminal conduct for which a
defendant admits responsibility—with or without an admission of committing
criminal conduct. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-201 (Supp. 2001) details the
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controlling provisions. The statute first defines "criminal activities" and "pecuniary
damages" as used in the section:
"Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is
convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits
responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of
committing criminal conduct.
Id. at § 76-3-201(1 )(b) (emphasis added).
"Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general
damages, which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil
action arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's
criminal activities . . . .
Id. at § 76-3-201(1 )(c). The statute then articulates the restitution requirement:
When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in
pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the
court shall order that the defendant make restitution to the victim of
crime.
§ 76-3-20 l(4)(a)(i). Finally, the statute reiterates that the court must include
damages that result from admitted criminal conduct when it determines restitution:
For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense
shall include any criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the
sentencing court or to which the defendant agrees to pay restitution.
§ 76-3-20l(8)(a) (emphasis added).
Under these provisions, a court must order restitution not only for damages
occasioned by the offense of which the defendant was convicted, but also for
damages occasioned by any criminal conduct for which a defendant admits
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responsibility. A defendant need not admit that he committed criminal conduct; it
suffices that he admits responsibility for it.
Defendant was convicted only of attempted falsification of title and
registration of a motor vehicle. Defendant, however, admitted transferring the van's
title to "someone else's name" in March or May of 1999. R. 29. Defendant
testified, in fact, that he "g[a]ve [someone associated with K.V. Body Shop] the
van." Id. at 28. This person was apparently Huang Ha. See PSI at 2. Following
the transfer, the van was apparently driven 13,000 miles; damaged in one or more
accidents; stripped of its console with TV and VCR and its stereo, speakers, and
running boards; and generally trashed. See PSI at 4; R. 58:33-39. Defendant's
admitted unauthorized transfer of the title and of the vehicle was criminal conduct.
That conduct "resulted in pecuniary damages," for which the court properly held
him responsible. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-20 l(4)(a)(i).
Defendant attempts to avoid responsibility because he did not personally inflict
the damages. He argues that he cannot therefore be held responsible for the
damages. Defendant's argument is contrary to Utah law.
A defendant is responsible to pay restitution for damages that are a foreseeable
result of his criminal conduct. Stated otherwise, a defendant is responsible for
damages that would not have occurred "but for" his criminal conduct.
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State v. McBride, 940 P.2d 539 (Utah App. 1997), provides controlling
authority. In that case, a vehicle was stolen from an automobile repair company,
but the theft was not reported for several weeks. Id. at 540. At some point
following the theft, police stopped McBride in the stolen vehicle for an equipment
violation. Id. Discovering registration violations, the police impounded the car and
delivered it to an impound lot. Id. Because the police erroneously transcribed the
vehicle's identification number, the impound lot was unable to locate the owner and
subsequently sold the car, resulting in a $600 loss to the owner. Id. at 541.
Meanwhile, McBride was charged with receiving a stolen vehicle. Id. He
later pled guilty to unlawful control over a motor vehicle, or joy riding. Id. The
trial court ordered that he pay $600 in restitution. Id.
McBride appealed, arguing that his unlawful exercise of control over the
vehicle did not cause the loss. Id. Rather, he argued, the loss was caused by the
superseding negligence of the police. Id. The appellate court rejected his
argument, holding that the subsequent negligent act was not "so unforeseeable as to
supersede" McBride's fault in causing the loss. Id. at 544. Further, the court held
that "but for" McBride's criminal act, which resulted in the impoundment of the
vehicle, the "loss would not have occurred." Id.
The connection between defendant's criminal activity and the victim's loss in
this case is much stronger than that in McBride. The possibility that the transferee
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might wreck or otherwise damage the vehicle in this case was much more
foreseeable than the series of events that lead to the impound sale in McBride.
Further, "but for" defendant's admitted unauthorized transfer of the title and
unauthorized conveyance of the vehicle to Huang Ha, the damages would not have
occurred. As in McBride, whether defendant was the final actor in the chain that
caused the damage is not dispositive. Whether defendant himself drove the van
when it was wrecked or had possession of the vehicle when it was stripped is not
dispositive. What is dispositive is that "but for" defendant's admitted acts, the
damages would not have occurred.
State ex rel Juvenile Dep 't v. Dickerson, 784 P.2d 1121 (Or. App. 1990),
where the reviewing court interprets the Oregon restitution statute after which
Utah's statute is patterned, further clarifies the appropriate analysis here. See State
v. Depaoli, 835 P.2d 162, 163 (Utah 1992) (stating that Utah's statute is "nearly
identical to an Oregon statute from which it was patterned"). In Dickerson, a
victim's home was burglarized twice. In the first burglary, a screen was damaged
and a door lock was broken. Id. at 1121. A number of items, including jewelry,
were stolen in the burglaries. Id. Defendants admitted that they had damaged the
screen door, entered the victim's home, and taken certain items, but denied that they
had taken the jewelry. Id. at 1122. The trial court ordered that the defendants pay
restitution for the jewelry. Id. The reviewing court affirmed, holding that "[tjhere
was a sufficient causal connection between [the defendants'] activities and the
12

loss." Id. The court apparently believed that the defendants' acts, damaging the
screen and entering the home, facilitated the second burglary, no matter who
committed it. "[T]he loss of the jewelry arose out of [the defendants'] criminal
activities and could be recovered in a civil action." Id.
The reviewing court stated: "There are three prerequisites for an award of
restitution: (1) criminal activity, (2) pecuniary damages and (3) a causal
relationship between the two." Id. It was not necessary "that it be proven that
[defendants] stole the jewelry, if [their] activities contributed to the loss." Id. at 98
n.4.
Similarly, this case involves, first, admitted criminal activity. Defendant
transferred the title and the van without authorization. Second, pecuniary damages
occurred. Third, a causal relationship existed between the criminal activity and the
pecuniary damages: "but for" the unauthorized transfers, the damages would not
have occurred. Stated otherwise, defendant's criminal activities contributed to the
victim's loss. Further, the damages that arose out of defendant's criminal activities
were damages that could be recovered in a civil action.
Defendant's cited cases are all distinguishable. Each case involves a
defendant who was convicted of one crime, but ordered to pay restitution for
another. In none of the cases did the defendant admit conduct that resulted in the
pecuniary damages for which restitution was ordered. See State v. Galli, 967 P.2d
930, 937-938 (Utah 1998) (defendant pled guilty to aggravated murder, but did not
13

admit responsibility for bail jumping; tnal court erred when it ordered defendant to
pay restitution to family members for forfeited bail); State v. Watson, 1999 UT App
273, Tf 5, 987 P.2d 1289 (defendant pled guilty to obstruction of justice, but did not
admit responsibility for murder; trial court erred when it ordered defendant to pay
restitution for costs of counseling murder victim's family); State v. Lefthandbull,
758 P.2d 343, 344-345 (Or. 1988) (defendant pled guilty to an attempt to
manufacture methamphetamine, but did not admit to any specific acts; trial court
erred when it held defendant responsible for the actual manufacture of
methamphetamine); State v. Davis, 458 N.W.2d 812 (S.D. 1990) (defendant pled
guilty to receiving stolen property, but did not admit to burglary; trial court erred
when it required restitution for all unrecovered property taken in burglary).
Defendant in this case, however, admitted that he gave false evidence to
procure a change in title and registration and that he transferred the van to a third
party. These unauthorized acts were criminal activities. Pecuniary damages
ensued. The admitted conduct led to the pecuniary damages—"but for"
defendant's criminal activities the van would have remained in his control.
Whoever wrecked and trashed the van got access to it because of defendant's
criminal activities. The trial court therefore properly ordered that defendant pay
restitution for the resulting damages.
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CONCLUSION
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY submitted on this /g

day of March 2002.

MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General
JjAM^^

JEANNE B. INOUYE
Assistant Attorney General
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Addendum A

76-4-101. Attempt - Elements of offense. (1) For purposes of this part a person is guilty of an
attempt to commit a crime if, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the
commission of the offense, he engages in conduct constituting a substantial step toward commission
of the offense.
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct does not constitute a substantial step unless it is strongly
corroborative of the actor's intent to commit the offense.
(3) No defense to the offense of attempt shall arise:
(a) Because the offense attempted was actually committed; or
(b) Due to factual or legal impossibility if the offense could have been committed had the
attendant circumstances been as the actor believed them to be.
Enacted by Chapter 196, 1973 General Session
Download Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 76_04002.ZIP 3,861 Bytes
Sections m this Chapter[Chapters in this Title|AH TitleslLegislative Home Page
Last revised' Thursday, July 12, 2001

41-la-1315. Second degree felony — False evidences of title and registration. It is a second
degree felony for a person with respect to a motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer to:
(1) fraudulently use a false or fictitious name in an application for registration, a certificate of title,
or for a duplicate certificate of title;
(2) knowingly make a false statement or knowingly conceal a material fact in an application under
this chapter;
(3) otherwise commit a fraud in an application under this chapter;
(4) alter with fraudulent intent a certificate of title, registration card, license plate, or permit issued
by the division;
(5) forge or counterfeit a document or license plate purporting to have been issued by the division;
(6) alter, falsify, or forge an assignment upon a certificate of title;
(7) hold or use a document or license plate under this chapter knowing it has been altered, forged,
or falsified; and
(8) file an application for a certificate of title providing false lien information, when the person
named on the application as lienholder does not hold a valid security interest.
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 1, 1992 General Session
Download Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 41_01166.ZIP 3,977 Bytes
Sections in this Chapter|Chapters in this TitleJAll Titles|Legislative Home Page
Last revised: Thursday, July 12, 2001

76-3-201. Definitions - Sentences or combination of sentences allowed - Civil penalties Restitution -- Hearing.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Conviction" includes a:
(i) judgment of guilt; and
(ii) plea of guilty.
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is convicted or any other
criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to the sentencing court with or
without an admission of committing the criminal conduct.
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general damages, which a person
could recover against the defendant in a civil action arising out of the facts or events constituting the
defendant's criminal activities and includes the money equivalent of property taken, destroyed,
broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including earnings and medical expenses.
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary damages to a victim,
including the accrual of interest from the time of sentencing, insured damages, and payment for
expenses to a governmental entity for extradition or transportation and as further defined in
Subsection (4)(c).
(e) (i) "Victim" means any person who the court determines has suffered pecuniary damages as a
result of the defendant's criminal activities.
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's criminal activities.
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a person convicted of an
offense to any one of the following sentences or combination of them:
(a) to pay a fine;
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office;
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law;
(d) to imprisonment;
(e) on or after April 27,1992, to life in prison without parole; or
(f) to death.
(3) (a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law to:
(i) forfeit property;
(ii) dissolve a corporation;
(iii) suspend or cancel a license;
(iv) permit removal of a person from office;
(v) cite for contempt; or
(vi) impose any other civil penalty.
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence.
(4) (a) (i) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary damages,
in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall order that the defendant make
restitution to victims of crime as provided in this subsection, or for conduct for which the defendant
has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea agreement. For purposes of restitution, a victim has
the meaning as defined in Subsection (l)(e).
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall follow the criteria and
procedures as provided in Subsections (4)(c) and (4)(d).
(iii) If the court finds the defendant owes restitution, the clerk of the court shall enter an
order of complete restitution as defined in Subsection (8)(b) on the civil judgment docket and provide
notice of the order to the parties.
(iv) The order is considered a legal judgment enforceable under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
and the person in whose favor the restitution order is entered may seek enforcement of the restitution

order in accordance with the Utah Rules of Ci\il Procedure. In addition, the Department of
Corrections may. on behalf of the person in whose favor the restitution order is entered, enforce the
restitution order as judgment creditor under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(v) If the defendant fails to obey a court order for payment of restitution and the victim or
department elects to pursue collection of the order by civil process, the victim shall be entitled to
recover reasonable attorney's fees.
(vi) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a lien when recorded in a judgment docket and
shall have the same effect and is subject to the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil action.
Interest shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of sentencing.
(vii) The Department of Corrections shall make rules permitting the restitution payments to be
credited to principal first and the remainder of payments credited to interest in accordance with Title
63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act.
(b) (i) If a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 77, Chapter 30, Extradition, to
resolve pending criminal charges and is convicted of criminal activity in the county to which he has
been returned, the court may, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, order that the
defendant make restitution for costs expended by any governmental entity for the extradition.
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall consider the criteria in
Subsection (4)(c).
(c) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete restitution and court-ordered
restitution.
(i) Complete restitution means the restitution necessary to compensate a victim for all losses
caused by the defendant.
(ii) Court-ordered restitution means the restitution the court having criminal jurisdiction orders the
defendant to pay as a part of the criminal sentence at the time of sentencing.
(iii) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be determined as provided in
Subsection (8).
(d) (i) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate under this subsection,
the court shall make the reasons for the decision a part of the court record.
(ii) In any civil action brought by a victim to enforce the judgment, the defendant shall be entitled
to offset any amounts that have been paid as part of court-ordered restitution to the victim.
(iii) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a lien when recorded in a judgment docket and
shall have the same effect and is subject to the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil action.
Interest shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of sentencing.
(iv) The Department of Corrections shall make rules permitting the restitution payments to be
credited to principal first and the remainder of payments credited to interest in accordance with Title
63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act.
(e) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the restitution, the court
shall at the time of sentencing allow the defendant a full hearing on the issue.
(5) (a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court shall order the defendant
to pay restitution of governmental transportation expenses if the defendant was:
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one county to another within the state at governmental
expense to resolve pending criminal charges;
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor; and
(iii) convicted of a crime.
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental transportation
expenses if any of the following apply:
(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction or on a subsequent failure to appear a warrant is
issued for an infraction; or
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order.
(c) (i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Subsection (5)(a)(i) shall be

calculated according to the following schedule:
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is transported;
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported; and
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported.
(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (5)(c)(i) applies to each defendant transported
regardless of the number of defendants actually transported in a single trip.
(6) (a) If a statute under which the defendant was convicted mandates that one of three stated
minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order imposition of the term of middle severity
unless there are circumstances in aggravation or mitigation of the crime.
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either party may submit a statement identifying
circumstances in aggravation or mitigation or presenting additional facts. If the statement is in
writing, it shall be filed with the court and served on the opposing party at least four days prior to the
time set for sentencing.
(c) In determining whether there are circumstances that justify imposition of the highest or lowest
term, the court may consider the record in the case, the probation officer's report, other reports,
including reports received under Section 76-3-404, statements in aggravation or mitigation submitted
by the prosecution or the defendant, and any further evidence introduced at the sentencing hearing.
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts supporting and reasons for imposing the upper
or lower term.
(e) In determining a just sentence, the court shall consider sentencing guidelines regarding
aggravating and mitigating circumstances promulgated by the Sentencing Commission.
(7) If during the commission of a crime described as child kidnapping, rape of a child, object rape
of a child, sodomy upon a child, or sexual abuse of a child, the defendant causes substantial bodily
injury to the child, and if the charge is set forth in the information or indictment and admitted by the
defendant, or found true by a judge or jury at trial, the defendant shall be sentenced to the highest
minimum term in state prison. This subsection takes precedence over any conflicting provision of
law.
(8) (a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense shall include any
criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the sentencing court or to which the defendant agrees
to pay restitution. A victim of an offense, that involves as an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or a
pattern of criminal activity, includes any person directly harmed by the defendant's criminal conduct
in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern.
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete restitution, the court shall
consider all relevant facts, including:
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage to or loss or destruction of
property of a victim of the offense;
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services and devices relating to physical,
psychiatric, and psychological care, including nonmedical care and treatment rendered in accordance
with a method of healing recognized by the law of the place of treatment; the cost of necessary
physical and occupational therapy and rehabilitation; and the income lost by the victim as a result of
the offense if the offense resulted in bodily injury to a victim; and
(iii) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense resulted in the death of a
victim.
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-ordered restitution, the court
shall consider the factors listed in Subsection (8)(b) and:
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that payment of restitution will impose,
with regard to the other obligations of the defendant;
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment basis or on other conditions to
be fixed by the court;

(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the pa\ment of restitution and the method of
payment; and
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines make restitution inappropriate.
(d) The court may decline to make an order or may defer entering an order of restitution if the
court determines that the complication and prolongation of the sentencing process, as a result of
considering an order of restitution under this subsection, substantially outweighs the need to provide
restitution to the victim.
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